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#26 03/06/2014 11h28 → Matières premières : intérêts des matières premières pour un rentier ? (matieres premieres)

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k9 a écrit :

Quelqu’un qui a investi il y a 14 ou 15 ans en bourse ne s’est pas vraiment protégé de l’inflation non plus…

Quelqu’un qui a investi il y a quatorze ou quinze ans dans IBM, Exxon ou Fastenal s’est très bien protégé de l’inflation, merci pour lui!

Evidemment, "en bourse", ca ne veut rien dire… C’est comme si vous alliez au marché le dimanche matin, et que votre femme au lieu de vous demander d’acheter une courgette vous demandait "d’acheter le marché".

Vous vous gratteriez la tête non?

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#27 22/05/2016 16h29 → Matières premières : intérêts des matières premières pour un rentier ? (matieres premieres)

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Dans sa dernière lettre trimestrielle (Grantham: Always Cry Over Spilt Milk (An Admission of a Past Mistake on Resources), le réputé Jeremy Grantham, de la firme GMO admet s’être complètement "planté" sur l’évolution des MPs, en particulier des métaux et du pétrole.

Pour faire simple :
1) une large partie de la demande de métaux (qui a fait monté les prix) venait de la Chine,
2) les producteurs se sont lancés dans des investissements colossaux (qui ont fait monter l’offre),
3) la Chine a brutalement et drastiquement réduit sa demande (d’où un déséquilibre complet entre l’offre et la demande).

Du très classique en fait (il y a toujours des décalages entre la temporalité de la demande et l’ajustement de l’offre), mais pas dans son ampleur.

Le pire, c’est que GMO a fait son succès sur le "retour à la moyenne" en montrant que toutes les bulles éclataient systématiquement et qu’il n’y avait pour ainsi dire jamais de changement de paradigme.

J. Grantham est donc aussi tombé dans le piège du "cette fois-ci c’est différent", comme il l’avoue lui-même !

Jeremy Grantham a écrit :

But, alas, I was fooled – along with all of the CEOs of the miners – by China. The foursigma event in mineral prices did not occur because those resources were running out. Not yet. Although there are suggestions in the data (see Exhibit 3) that we are running low on some low-cost resources: Even in the current truly sensational glut, the 34 equal-weighted index is only two-thirds of the way back to the old trend. I would guess, though, that in explaining the price behavior of commodities for the last 15 years I would only allocate a weighting of 20% or so to elements of paradigm shift.

■ Nor was the bubble in minerals caused predominantly by massive speculation, momentum, and skullduggery in my opinion, although those components, as was suggested at the time by Frank Veneroso (a financial consultant), had considerably more impact than I had then thought. I would still give these factors only a 20% weight in explaining our current glut and future outlook.

■ No, China was the dominant 60% input: the sheer magnitude and the long 30-year duration of its growth surge; the remarkable late acceleration in growth rate; and, finally, the abrupt cessation of growth. Taken together, these developments constituted the four-sigma event.

■ I had warned of trouble if China slowed its growth for demand for minerals quickly. They did far worse than that. They absolutely stopped growing at all (see Exhibit 4). I completely missed the possibility of such an extreme outcome.

■ By the time China’s growth in demand for metals (and coal) stopped dead, the miners had spent an unprecedented $1.25 trillion in expansion to keep up, helped in their efforts by several earlier years of record profits.

■ Due to long time lags (of up to seven years), new capacity will be coming online for two or three more years despite the current glut.

■ If China simultaneously succeeds in lowering its share of capital spending to GDP to 32% in 10 years from today’s 47% – which is its intention – then the need for growth in capital-spending-type resources will be about nil (47% x 100 = 47 goes to 32% x 148 = 47).

■ There is therefore unlikely to be a quick or dramatic recovery in demand for metals. Stock prices, on the other hand, from these beaten-down levels (of late 2015) are much harder to predict.

■ My suggestion of a positive intermediate-term (10-year) outlook for mining resources therefore seems to have been a major error, especially for iron ore and bauxite.

How could I make such an error? I had thought that a 2.2 million to 1 possibility for iron ore must imply a new trend. Although this may usually be a valid assumption for such extreme outliers, it is obviously not universally so. For example, the land under the Emperor’s Palace really did have a market value equal to the state of California. Yet it spent the next 26 years declining, with all Japanese land values, back to normal: a classic looking paradigm shift that, like iron ore, turned out to be a mean-reverting bubble after all. In bubble history it appears no fixed rule works 100% of the time.

I could and should have made good money playing against the bubble in minerals, as we did playing against the three other major asset bubbles of the last 20 years. This event in metals indeed turned out to be not the second important paradigm shift, as I thought, but the fourth great bubble of the last 100 years!

■ The best I can say in my defense is that I gave a good warning of the possible risks in my original report: “If China stumbles or if the weather is better than expected, a probability I would put at, say, 80%, then commodity prices will decline a lot. But if both events occur together, it will very probably break the market en masse. Not unlike the financial collapse.” And this is indeed what happened. I had thought it probable that short-term prices would decline, possible that both negatives would occur together, but highly unlikely that they would both be as extreme, as turned out to be the case.

Source : Grantham: Always Cry Over Spilt Milk

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